This article investigates formal properties of a family of semantically sound flow-sensitive type systems for tracking information flow in simple While programs. The family is indexed by the choice of flow lattice.
Introduction
This article investigates formal properties of a family of flowsensitive type systems for tracking information flow.
The analysis of information flow in programs has received considerable attention in recent years due to its connection to the problem of secure information flow [SM03] . The classic end-to-end confidentiality policy says that if certain data in a system is considered secret from the perspective of a certain observer of the system, then during computation there should be no information flow from Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. POPL'06 January 11-13, 2006, Charleston, South Carolina, USA. Copyright c 2006 ACM 1-59593-027-2/06/0001. . . $5.00. that data to that observer. Denning and Denning [DD77] pioneered the use of program analysis to statically determine if the information flow properties of a program satisfy a certain confidentiality policy.
Most of the more recent work in this area (see [SM03] for an overview) has been based upon the use of security type systems to formulate the analysis of secure information flow, and to aid in a rigorous proof of its correctness.
We will focus, like many works in the area, on systems in which secrets are stored in variables. Security levels are associated with variables, and this describes the intended secrecy of the contents. The simplest instance of the problem involves two security levels: high (h) which denotes secrets, and low (l) which denotes public data. A partial ordering, l h, denotes that the only permitted information flow is from l to h. The security problem is to verify that there is no dependency between the initial value of the high variables (the secret to which the program has access), and the final value of the low variables (the outputs which are visible to the public).
With respect to the treatment of variables, one feature of almost all recent type based systems is that they are flow-insensitive. This means that the order of execution is not taken into account in the analysis. One simple intuition for the notion of flow-insensitivity [NRH99] is that an analysis is flow-insensitive if the results for analysing C 1 ; C 2 are the same as that for C 2 ; C 1 . In this respect the analysis of [VSI96] (which can be viewed as a reformulation of Denning and Denning's original analysis) is flow-insensitive. In particular flow-insensitivity of this style of type system means that if a program is to be typed as "secure" then every subprogram must also be typed as "secure". So for example the trivial program l := h ; l := 0 where h contains a secret, and the final value of l is low (publicly observable) is considered insecure because the subprogram l := h is insecure.
More generally, flow-insensitivity uses a single abstraction (in this case a single security level) to represent each variable in the program. Flow-sensitivity, on the other hand, increases accuracy by providing a different abstraction at each program point.
Although there are a number of empirical/experimental analyses of the relationship between flow-sensitive and flow-insensitive program analyses (see e.g. [CH95] ), there has been very little discussion of this dimension in connection to information flow analysis.
In this article we investigate flow-sensitive typings for a simple While language. We present a family of semantically sound security type systems (parameterised by the choice of flow lattice) which allow the type of a variable to "float", assigning different security types at different points in the program (Section 2).
Although this type system is extremely simple, it turns up some surprises. Our main results are the following:
• Although we can freely choose an arbitrarily complex flow lattice, there is a single "universal" lattice, and hence a single type system, from which all other typings in all other instances can be deduced. In fact, all possible typings in all possible lattices can be obtained from one principal typing in the universal lattice. From the principal typing, we can construct both the strongest (smallest) output typing for a given input typing, and the weakest (largest) input typing for a given output typing. The universal lattice is the powerset of program variables.
• For the universal lattice, we show that the type system is equivalent to Amtoft and Banerjee's Hoare-like logic for program dependence [AB04] , which is expressed in terms of input-variable output-variable independence pairs. Because our formulation is based on dependence rather than independence, it is arguably simpler and admits a more straightforward correctness proof, without the need to resort to a non-standard trace semantics.
• In general, some lattices are more expressive than others. For example, in contrast to the two-point lattice l h, a single derivation in the type system for the universal lattice can identify fine-grained inter-variable dependencies of the form "x may depend on the initial value of y but not on z". Despite this variation in expressiveness, we establish in Section 6 an "internal completeness" result which shows that no type system in the family can give better results for a given choice of lattice than the type system for that lattice itself.
• Finally in Section 7 we show that for any program typeable in an instance of the flow-sensitive system, we are able to construct an equivalent program which is typeable in a simple flowinsensitive system. The translation is given by a security-typedirected translation, introducing extra variables. This general approach could be useful in a proof-carrying-code setting where the code consumer can have a simple type system, but the code producer is free to work in a more permissive system and use the translation to provide more easily checked code.
Related Work
A number of authors have presented flow-sensitive information flow analyses e.g. [CHH02] . Those close in style to a type system formulation include Banâtre et al [BBL94] , who present a system very similar to that of [AB04] , except that all indirect flows are handled in a pre-pass. Andrews and Reitman describe a similar logic [AR80] but did not consider semantic soundness. In the treatment of information flow analysis of low level code (e.g., [GS05, HS05] ), flow-sensitivity arises as an essential component to handle single threaded structures such as stacks and registers, since obviously stacks and registers cannot be assigned a fixed type throughout program execution.
The transformation we present in Section 7 is related to single static assignment(SSA) [CFR + 89] , although the perspective is quite different. We discuss this further in Section 7.6
A Family of Type Systems
We work with a simple While language with the usual semantics. Program variables are drawn from a finite set Var. A flowinsensitive type system, such as that in [VSI96] , has the following form: each variable is assigned a fixed security level. When assigning an expression to a variable x := E, all variables in E must have an equal or lower security level. When assignments take place in loops or conditional branches, to avoid indirect information flows the level of x must be at least as high as the level of any variable in the branching expression.
To allow types to be flow-sensitive, we must allow the type of a variable to "float". For example, taking the two-point flow lattice, when assigning an expression to a variable x := y +x, if x has type Table 1 . Flow-Sensitive Type Rules l before the assignment and y has type h, then after the assignment x must be considered to have type h. The flow-sensitive system we define is a family of inference systems, one for each choice of flow lattice L (where L may be any finite lattice). For a command C, judgements have the form
where p ∈ L, and Γ, Γ are type environments of type Var → L. The inference rules are shown in Table 1 . The idea is that if Γ describes the security levels of variables which hold before execution of C, then Γ will describe the security levels of those variables after execution of C. The type p represents the usual "program counter" level and serves to eliminate indirect information flows; the derivation rules ensure that only variables which end up (in Γ ) with types greater than or equal to p may be changed by C. We
We drop the L subscript from judgements where the identity of the lattice is clear from the context or is not relevant to the discussion.
In some of the derivation rules we write Γ E : t to mean that expression E has type t assuming type environment Γ. Throughout this paper the type of an expression is defined simply by taking the lub of the types of its free variables:
This is consistent with the typings used in many systems, though more sophisticated typing rules for expressions would be possible in principle.
Semantic Soundness
The type systems satisfy a straightforward non-interference condition: only changes to inputs with types t should be visible to outputs with type t. More precisely, given a derivation Γ {C} Γ , the final value of a variable x with final type t = Γ (x), should depend at most on the initial values of those variables y with initial types Γ(y) t. Following [HS91, SS01, HR98] we formalise this using equivalence relations.
Definition 3.1. Let R and S be equivalence relations on stores. We say that program C maps R into S, written C :
We note that this is a partial correctness condition: it allows C to terminate on σ but diverge on ρ, even when σ R ρ. This reflects the fact that the type systems take no account of the ways in which the values of variables may affect a program's termination behaviour. Given Γ : Var → L and t ∈ L, we write = Γ,t for the equivalence relation on stores which relates stores which are equal on all variables having type t in environment Γ, thus:
The formal statement of correctness for a derivation p Γ {C} Γ has two parts, one asserting a simple safety property relating to p (as described in Section 2) and the other asserting the noninterference property.
Definition 3.2. The semantic security relation p |= L Γ {C} Γ holds iff both the following conditions are satisfied:
As with L , we suppress the L subscript where possible. We write
The proof for condition 2 of the semantic security relation depends on condition 1, but not vice versa. Proof of condition 1 is by an easy argument that Γ (x) p implies that C contains no assignments to x. Proof of condition 2 is by induction on the derivation.
The reverse implication, semantic completeness, does not hold, as shown by the following: 
The Algorithmic Type System
In this section we introduce a variant of the typing rules in which the weakening rule (Sub) is removed and folded into the If and While rules. The result is a system which calculates the smallest Γ such that p L Γ {C} Γ . The Skip, Assign and Seq rules are unchanged. The replacement If and While rules are shown in Table 2. The rules are deterministic: given an input type environment exactly one derivation is possible for any given C. (Well, almost. The While rule allows the chain Γ 0 , Γ 1 , · · · , Γ n to be extended arbitrarily by appending unnecessary repetitions of the limit. We may assume that n is chosen minimally.) 
Theorem 4.1 (Algorithmic Correctness). For all L and for all C:
. ., with F and G being monotone functions derived from A C L ; thus these sequences form the ascending chains shown in Figure 1 . The chains have finite height because the lattices are finite, thus n is guaranteed to exist such that Γ n+1 = Γ n and it is then immediate that Γ m = Γ n for all m > n. Put more succinctly, the While rule specifies Γ n as an iterative construction of the least fixed point of a monotone function on a finite lattice.
The proofs of parts 2 and 3 of the theorem are then by straightforward inductions on the p L Γ {C} Γ derivation and the structure of C, respectively.
In Section 7 we adapt this version of the type system to define a program transformation which allows the use of conventional fixedtype systems in place of the flow-sensitive ones.
A Limiting Case: Dependency Analysis
Given the correctness condition, it is clear that the type systems defined above are calculating dependency relationships between program variables. Intuitively, we might expect to gain the most precise dependency information by choosing the flow lattice P(Var), which allows us to consider arbitrary sets of variables (including the singleton sets) as distinct types. In Section 6 we explore in detail this question of precision, with some slightly surprising results. Section 6 also formally establishes the special status of the type system for P(Var); anticipating this, we introduce some terminology:
Definition 5.1. The universal lattice is the flow lattice P(Var) of sets of program variables. The universal system is the corresponding type system.
In this section we show that the universal system is equivalent to (is, in fact, the De Morgan dual of) Amtoft and Banerjee's Hoarestyle independence logic [AB04] .
For notational clarity when comparing the universal system with other choices of L, we let ∆, ∆ range over type environments just in the universal system (thus ∆, ∆ : Var → P(Var)). 
G T {C} T where G ∈ P(Var) and T, T ∈ P(Var × Var).
The idea is roughly as follows. Suppose that C is preceded by some previous computation on the store. We will refer to the value of a variable before this preceding computation as its original value. Then a pair [x#y] in T represents an assertion that the value of x after C is independent of the original value of y, assuming that all the independence pairs in T are valid for the preceding computation. For ease of comparison, rather than sets of independence pairs T , we present the logic in terms of mappings ∇, ∇ : Var → P(Var) (this depends simply on the set isomorphism A × B ∼ = A → P(B)). Thus Amtoft-Banerjee (AB) judgements in our presentation have the form
The AB derivation rules are shown in Table 3 . The ordering is pointwise reverse subset inclusion, thus:
Note that the ordering used on G is just ⊆, not . The relationship between the AB logic and the universal system is straightforward: for each ∆ there is a corresponding ∇ such that ∇(x) is the complement of ∆(x). Where the universal system derives sets of dependencies, the AB logic simply derives the complementary set of independencies. (An AB context set G, on the other hand, corresponds directly to the same set p in a P(Var)-derivation.) We use the following notation:
Clearly this is an order isomorphism: ∆ = ∆ and ∆ 1 ∆ 2 iff ∆ 1 ∆ 2 , etc.
Theorem 5.2. The AB logic and the universal system are De Morgan duals. That is, G ∆ {C} ∆ is derivable in the universal system iff G ∆ {C} ∆ is derivable in the AB logic.
The proof amounts, essentially, to showing that each AB rule is the dual of the universal system counterpart. This is not quite literally true, since the way some AB rules are formulated builds in the potential for implicit weakening, which must be made explicit using Sub in the corresponding P(Var)-derivation. For example, consider the second side condition on the rule IfAB. If we re-state this in its contrapositive form
it is easily seen that the two side-conditions together amount to
Note that any subderivation concluding at a premise to IfAB with G strictly greater than required by (1), can have an instance of SubAB added at the end to make
. With this caveat, the side condition for IfAB is equivalent to the If premise in the universal system. Similar observations apply to the side conditions for AssignAB and WhileAB.
Internal Completeness
In this section we explore a fundamental relationship between different members of our family of flow-sensitive type systems. For simplicity of presentation, we consider only "top-level" typing judgements, ie, those of the form Γ {C} Γ (see Section 6.3 for further remarks on this point). We start by formalising a key notion: the sense in which one typing can be viewed as subsuming another (possibly in a different lattice). Given Γ, Γ : Var → L, we refer to a pair Γ {·} Γ as an L-typing. If Γ {C} Γ we say that typing Γ {·} Γ is derivable for C.
Note that this is a semantic notion of subsumption: one typing subsumes another precisely when the non-interference property specified by the former is stronger -satisfied by fewer programsthan that specified by the latter. As we shall see (Theorem 6.3), the type systems actually faithfully reflect this semantic relationship.
As defined, subsumption appears difficult to verify, since it quantifies over all possible programs. In fact, it suffices to compare the order relationships between the two pairs of type environments:
Proof. For the only if direction we show the contrapositive. Assume Γ 1 (x) Γ 1 (y) and Γ 2 (x) Γ 2 (y). We must find some command C such that (the use of 0 here is arbitrary, any constant will do). It is then easy to verify that C :
For the if direction, Assume
Suppose σ = Γ 2 ,s ρ and C, σ ⇓ σ and C, ρ ⇓ ρ and Γ 2 (y) s. We must show σ (y) = ρ (y). Now, for any x, This result shows that the semantic content of a judgement Γ {C} Γ is uniquely determined by the set of pairs {(x, y)|Γ(x) Γ (y)}: the smaller this set, the stronger the non-interference property. In fact, these pairs are precisely the dependencies allowed by the typing: if Γ(x) Γ (y) then the final value of y after executing C may depend on the initial value of x. Alternatively, we may consider the contrapositive form of Theorem 6.2, which says that
This allows us to understand a typing in terms of independence relations (as used by Amtoft and Banerjee). The larger the set {(x, y)|Γ(x) Γ (y)}, the stronger the non-interference property: if Γ(x) Γ (y) then the final value of y after executing C must be independent of the initial value of x. Now suppose we have an L 1 -typing which subsumes an L 2 -typing, and suppose we find that the L 2 -typing is not derivable for C in the L 2 -type system. Will it ever be possible to verify the soundness of the L 2 -typing for C indirectly, by deriving the subsuming L 1 -typing in the L 1 -system instead? We might expect this to happen in the case that L 1 has more points, and is therefore able to make more refined dependency distinctions, than L 2 . Consider the examples shown in Figure 2 , where L is the four point lattice depicted. It can readily be verified that the P(Var)-typing subsumes the L-typing and both judgements are derivable. However, the L judgement simply assigns y the most conservative typing in L, whereas the P(Var) judgement captures the fact that the final value of y may depend on both x and z, but not on the initial value of y. Could it be, that as part of a derivation for some larger program, this fine-grained derivation for y enables us to derive a P(Var)-typing subsuming an L-typing which cannot be derived in the simpler L-system? Surprisingly, the answer is No, as confirmed by the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3 (Internal Completeness
Before we can prove the theorem, we need to develop some further machinery. As an additional benefit of this development, we find that, for each command C, there is a principal typing from which all others can be obtained.
Monotone Renaming of Types
This section establishes a key technical result used in the proof of the Internal Completeness theorem. Roughly speaking, the result says that we can take any derivation and, by consistently renaming the security types, obtain a new one. The notion of renaming is very general and allows us to translate a derivation for one choice of lattice into a derivation for a different lattice; we require only that the renaming function be monotone. Given Γ : Var → L 1 and a renaming function f :
for the pointwise extension of f to Γ, thus f
Lemma 6.4 (Monotone Renaming
Proof. By induction on the height of the L 1 -derivation. We present the Assign and While cases by way of illustration.
Case: Assign. W ehaveanL 1 -derivation of the form:
)(y) for all y = x and it remains to show f (p) t f (p t). Now by monotonicity of f we have
Finally, using this and monotonicity of f again, we have
Case: While. W ehaveanL 1 -derivation of the form: 
Canonical Derivations
Given the Monotone Renaming lemma, we might hope to prove the Internal Completeness theorem by a construction for a suitable monotone renaming function to translate the L 1 -derivation into an L 2 -derivation for the subsumed typing. However, since an appropriate construction is not immediately obvious 1 , we go via an indirect route. We begin our detour by showing how to produce any given derivation L Γ {C} Γ from a particular form of derivation in the universal system. To do this we construct, for each choice of Γ, an abstract interpretation [CC77] which is given by a pair of monotone renaming maps: 
These maps enjoy a special status. Recall [DP90] that a Galois Connection (GC) between L 1 and L 2 is a pair of maps α, γ with α :
t ⇐⇒ s γ(t). Key properties of a GC are that α, γ are both monotone, α • γ id, γ • α id, α preserves joins and γ preserves meets. Furthermore, the two component maps uniquely determine each other, thus: Our first use of these renaming functions is, given an L-typing Γ {·} Γ , to construct a typing in the universal system which subsumes it. A central rôle is played by the particular P(Var) type environment which maps each x to the singleton {x}. We denote this environment by ∆ 0 . Thus, for all x ∈ Var, ∆ 0 (x) def = {x}.
Proof. Assume ∆ 0 (x) ⊆ γ Γ (Γ (y)). We must show that Γ(x) Γ (y). Since ∆ 0 (x) = {x}, the assumption is just x ∈ γ Γ (Γ (y)), hence Γ(x) Γ (y) by definition of γ Γ .
It turns out that the two related typings stand or fall together: for any C, the one is derivable if and only if the other is. 1 Though we can read it off easily enough once we have the proof. It is: For the ⇐ direction, Monotone Renaming gives α *
Γ . Thus the required derivation follows by appending a single use of Sub. Now we can prove the theorem stated at the start of Section 6.
We must show L 2 Γ 2 {C} Γ 2 which, by the Canonical Derivations lemma, is equivalent to
Furthermore, again by the Canonical Derivations lemma, the existence of our assumed derivation is equivalent to
It thus suffices to show
and append a single use of Sub to derive (7) from (8). To show (9) we must show Γ 1 (y) Γ 1 (x) ⇒ Γ 2 (y) Γ 2 (x), and this is just the assumed type subsumption, so we are done.
As we noted above, the use of Galois Connections above is a form of abstract interpretation, and is reminiscent of the study of complete abstract interpretations [CC79, GRS00]. We have not explored these connections deeply, but a key difference would appear to be in our use of a different GC for each choice of Γ, rather than a single GC relating all L-derivations to counterpart derivations in the universal system.
Principal Typings
As an additional corollary of the Canonical Derivations lemma, we find that, for each command C, there is a typing derivable for C from which all others can be inferred, namely
where ∆ C is the smallest ∆ such that ∆ 0 {C} ∆ (recall that, by Corollary 4.2, this exists and is given by A C P(Var) (∅, ∆ 0 )). The Canonical Derivations lemma shows that derivability of any given L Γ {C} Γ is equivalent to ∀x.∆ C (x) ⊆ γ * Γ (Γ (x)), which unpacks to:
In fact, we can show that ∆ 0 {·} ∆ C is a principal typing for C, in the sense defined by Wells [Wel02] . Transposed to our setting 2 , Wells makes the following definitions:
• A pre-order on typings:
Theorem 6.9 (Principal Typing). ∆ 0 {·} ∆ C is principal for C.
Before proving the theorem we state an easy lemma about subsumption:
. By the Canonical Derivations lemma (using
As noted earlier, we have restricted attention to typing judgements p Γ {C} Γ with p =⊥. While this is appropriate when we wish to consider whole programs, it does not allow us to apply our principal typings result compositionally. We believe the results above extend straightforwardly to the general case, the key step being to adjoin a "program counter variable" to Var, so the universal lattice becomes P(Var + {pc}).
Polymorphism
The principal typing result above suggests that we should be able to view typings in the universal system as polymorphic, in some sense. In fact, this can be done quite directly: we may take an isomorphic view of P(Var) which shows typings in the universal system to be polymorphic in the standard sense of types involving type variables. Assume given a set of type variables TVar ∼ = Var, ranged over by β. Assume also some particular 1-1 mapping between the two sets: we write β x for the type variable associated to program variable x. In this view, ∆ 0 is a type environment which assigns a unique polymorphic variable β x to each x. The application of α Γ to ∆ 0 in the proof (⇐) of the Canonical Derivations lemma amounts to an instantiation of the type variables to produce Γ. In general, α Γ interprets a set T of type variables as the lub of the interpretations of its elements. Thus, in this view, types in the P(TVar) lattice can be thought of as formal lubs, which can be interpreted as elements in any lattice L by fixing an interpretation I for each β.
As above, let ∆ C be the smallest ∆ such that ∆ 0 {C} ∆ . It can be shown that fixing Γ and calculating α *
More interestingly, ∆ C may also be used in the reverse direction, to calculate the greatest Γ such that Γ {C} Γ for a given Γ . The idea is to construct an interpretation I : TVar → L which "unifies" ∆ C and Γ , in the sense that
for all x, where α I (T ) def = F β∈T I(β). The greatest I satisfying this equation for all x is given by
2 For this purpose, we view our family as a single type system consisting of the disjoint union of all its members.
The hope is that taking Γ(x) def = I(β x ) should then give us the greatest Γ such that Γ {C} Γ . This is borne out by the following:
Proof. By the Canonical Derivations lemma, it suffices to show that the Γ defined is the greatest such that
Firstly, we show that (13) holds by showing that γ Γ (Γ (x)) ⊇ ∆ C (x) for all x. Suppose β y ∈ ∆ C (x), then we must show that Γ(y) = I(β y ) Γ (x). This holds because β y ∈ ∆ C (x) implies Γ (x) belongs to the set over which the meet is taken in (12). It remains to show that γ *
We show the contrapositive, so suppose Γ Γ. Thus, by (12), for some z, β x ∈ ∆ C (z) and
Transformation to Fixed-Types
We have seen that floating types enable more programs to be typed than a standard fixed-type approach. In this section we show that if a program is typeable in the floating type system, then there is an equivalent program which is typeable in a traditional fixed-type system. We show this by construction: we extend the type system so that it also generates such a program. Take as an example the following valid judgement for the flow lattice l h, and the type
l Γ {l := h; l := 0; h := 0; l := h} Γ A traditional security type system would not be able to handle this example because the level of l becomes temporarily high, and then the level of h becomes low. To systematically transform the program to make it typeable by a fixed-type system, we represent each variable by a family of variables, one for each element of the flow lattice. The idea is that at any point in the computation we will be working with one particular member of the family. Whenever we need to raise the type of a variable from s to t in the original program we represent this in the transformed program by performing an assignment to move information from x s to x t , and by henceforth working with x t .
Using this idea, the above program can be represented by the following:
l h := h h ; l l := 0; h l := 0; l l := h l where h h and h l , for example, are distinct variables. The initial inputs l and h are here represented by l l and h h respectively. In a flow-insensitive security type system the program is deemed secure because l l (and h l ) only ever contain "low" information.
Fixed Variables
To discuss fixed types more precisely it is convenient to introduce a new class of such type-indexed variables into the language: Definition 7.1. For any given lattice of types L, define the set of fixed variables, FVar, to be the set of type-indexed variables
To distinguish the fixed variables from the "ordinary" variables we will henceforth refer to the variables in Var as floating variables.
So, for example, if we are working in the two-level flow lattice, then for each floating variable x, we have in addition two fixed variables x l and x h .
We will now extend the language with fixed-type variables. Their dynamic semantics is just as for floating variables. We are going to present a transformation by adapting the algorithmic version of the type system, but first we must extend it to cover fixedtype variables: we extend the rule for expressions and add a rule for fixed-type assignment. We do not extend the type environments to cover fixed variables since their type is given by their index.
Let fv(E) denote the free floating variables (as before), and define ffv(E) to denote the free fixed variables of expression E (and similarly for commands). Then the typing of expressions in the extended language is given by
The fixed type rule is simply:
It is straightforward to extend the soundness arguments to encompass fixed variables.
Note that if we restrict our attention to programs with no free floating variables (fv(C) = ∅), then type environments are redundant. We will use metavariable D to range over commands with no free floating variables. We will write p D to denote p a Γ {D} Γ for arbitrary Γ. It should be straightforward to see that derivations of this form correspond exactly to derivations in e.g. Volpano, Smith and Irvine's system [VSI96] , and other Denning-style analyses, although we will not prove this formally.
Translation
Now we present the translation as an extension of the type system (algorithmic version) to judgements of the form
(we do not decorate for this system since the form of the judgements readily distinguish them from the previously defined systems). First we need some basic constructions and notations. With these definitions we are ready to introduce the translation. The rules are presented in Table 4 .
The basic idea of the translation p L Γ {C ❀ D} Γ is that for any program point in D corresponding to a point in C, for each variable x, only one member of the family {x t } t∈L will be "in play". The type variables in play at any given program point are given by the type environment at that program point. So for example if Γ(x) = s then x s will be the x-variable in play at the beginning of the execution of D. (Figure 2 ).
It remains to establish two properties of the translated terms:
• Correctness: they should be semantically equivalent to the original terms, and • Static Soundness: they should still be typeable.
Correctness
Correctness means that the input-output behaviour of the program and its translation should be the same. We refer to this as semantic equivalence. Since the original programs operate on floating variables, and the translation operates on fixed variables, we must construct a suitable relation between them. Definition 7.6. Let σ range over floating variable stores and let ρ range over fixed variable stores. Then for each type environment Γ we define the compatibility relation as
Theorem 7.7 (Translation Correctness).
If p Γ {C ❀ D} Γ then for all σ and ρ such that σ ∼ Γ ρ,
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Static Soundness
The fact that the translated programs are equivalent to the originals ensures that they have the same security properties, since noninterference is an extensional property. Here we show, more significantly, that the translated program is also typeable -and since it only contains fixed variables this means that it is typeable in a conventional fixed type system.
Lemma 7.8 (Expression Soundness
Follows directly from the definitions.
Theorem 7.9 (Static Soundness
). If p Γ {C ❀ D} Γ then p D Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Complexity
The transformation increases program size by adding assignments of the form Γ := Γ. These assignments arise whenever, in the flow-sensitive system, a variable changes its level. Since the only way that a variable can change its level is through an assignment, the size of Γ := Γ is bounded by the number (a) of assignment statements in the original program. The number of such assignments that are added to the program is proportional to the number (b) of conditional and while statements. This gives us a bound of O(ab), i.e., quadratic in the program size. This upper bound is tight, as shown by the following program, where we use the two-point lattice, and initially h is the only variable assigned type h: It seems likely that there is a more precise bound based on the depth of nesting of loops and conditions, and that such blow ups are unlikely in practice.
Relation to Single Static Assignment
Our transformation introduces additional variables, and this addition is performed in such a way that a flow-insensitive analysis on the transformed program achieves the same effect as a flowsensitive analysis on the original. Viewed in this way, our transformation has a similar effect to transformation to single static assignment form (SSA) (see e.g. [App98] ). Single static assignment is used in the compilation chain to improve and simplify dataflow analyses. It works by the introduction of additional variables in such a way that every variable is assigned-to exactly once. Since there is only one assignment per variable, it follows by construction that there is no need for a flow-sensitive analysis on a program in SSA form, since there is only one program point that can influence the type of a variable.
Our transformation is however rather different from SSA. The transformation we have described uses a flow-sensitive analysis in order to construct the transformed program, whereas SSA's purpose is to avoid the need to perform more complex analyses in the first place. Thus our transformation approach is perhaps not interesting when viewed from a classic compiler-construction perspective.
However, applications such as security are not directly relevant to optimisation and compilation. In a mobile-code setting, a code consumer may demand that the code can be verified to satisfy some information-flow policy. Furthermore, in order to have a small trusted computing base, a small and simple type system is preferable. Transformations of the kind presented here are interesting in this setting because they allow the code producer the benefits of constructing well-typed code in a more expressive system, without requiring the code consumer to verify code with respect to this more complex system 3 .
Conclusions
We have presented and investigated the formal properties of a family of semantically sound flow-sensitive type systems for tracking information flow in simple While programs. The family is indexed by the choice of flow lattice. The key results we have shown are that:
• For a given program, all derivations in all members of the family can be inferred from the derivation of a principal typing in the universal system (ie, the type system for the flow lattice P(Var)).
• The universal system is equivalent to Amtoft and Banerjee's Hoare-style independence logic.
• Each member of the family is "complete" with respect to the whole family, in that no member can be used to validate more L-typings than the L-system itself.
• Given a flow-sensitive type derivation for a program, we can systematically transform it to produce a semantically equivalent program which is typeable in a simple flow-insensitive system.
Possible avenues for future work include extending the flowsensitive systems and program transformation to richer programming languages and deriving more precise complexity results for the program transformation. By construction, Γ k+1 (x) = Γ k (x) Γ(x) so, by supposition, Γ k+1 (x) = Γ k (x) Γ(x). But by IH Γ k (x) = Γ(x), hence Γ k+1 (x) = Γ(x).
We have shown that Γ n (x) = Γ(x) implies the existence of some i such that Γ i (x) = Γ i (x) so, by the induction hypothesis, p t i Γ i (x), hence p Γ i (x). But, as illustrated in Figure 1 , Γ i Γ n holds for all i, so we are done.
